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SeSSion 9
eMeRGinG PoLiCY AnD PRACTiCe iSSUeS
Steven L. Schooner  
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law  
The George Washington University Law School 
David J. Berteau  
Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group  
Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Washington D.C.
i. CRiSiS, oR KiCKinG THe CAn DoWn THe STReeT?
A. Sequestration and the Fiscal Cliff: January 2, 2013, and Beyond. The (dominant, ines-
capable) emerging issue in government contracting, looking ahead, is the money (or lack of it). As the 
fiscal belt tightens, the procurement landscape – what the government buys, from whom, and how – 
will necessarily change. Much of 2012 was spent anticipating some dramatic, difficult decision-making 
which, apparently, will now be further delayed. While a worst case scenario may have been avoided 
with a New Year’s deal, nothing suggests that the major underlying structural concerns have been 
addressed. In other words, the can may have been kicked down the street, but neither the uncertainty 
nor the anxiety surrounding acquisition forecasting has been in any way diminished.
B. But What Have We Learned? Of course, that does not mean there is nothing to discuss – 
innumerable interesting issues remain unresolved. See,e .g., Mary Beth Bosco, Feature Comment: 
“Sequestration—What It Means, Will It Happen, What To Do If You Are A DOD Contractor,” 54 GC ¶ 
239; 54 GC ¶ 244(e); Robert H. Koehler, Feature Comment: Can Contractors Rely On OMB’s WARN 
Act ‘Guidance’?, 54 GC ¶ 335; Nonprofit Report Suggests DOD Sequestration Cuts Are Doable, 54 GC 
¶ 350 (“task force report from the Center for American Progress … suggests that the cuts to the [DoD] 
budget mandated by sequestration and the Budget Control Act of 2011 … are ‘readily achievable with 
no sacrifice to our security – if the cuts are done in a thoughtful manner over the next decade.’”), see 
also Rebalancing Our National Security: The Benefits of Implementing a Unified Security Budget, 
available at www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/UnifiedSecurityBudget.pdf; 
Groups Urge Sequestration Action, Highlight Risks, 54 GC ¶ 338(c); House Committee Wants OMB 
Communications on Sequestration, 54 GC ¶ 322(d); OMB Memo Reiterates DOL WARN Act Sequestra-
tion Guidance, Clarifies Cost Liability, 54 GC ¶ 315, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/2012/m-12-19.pdf; White House Gives Sequestration Report to Congress, 54 GC 
¶ 288(c); see also, President Signs Sequestration Transparency Act, 54 GC ¶ 250; President Exempts 
Troops from Sequestration, 54 GC ¶ 244(e); Sequestration Transparency Bill Goes To President, DOL 
Issues WARN Act Guidance, 54 GC ¶ 236; Contractors, Industry Warn Of Sequestration Risks, 54 GC ¶ 
223; Sequestration Debate Continues, Impasse Looms, 54 GC ¶ 213; Senators Call For Action To Avert 
Sequestration, 54 GC ¶ 206; Deputy Defense Secretary, House Intel Chair Oppose Sequestration, 54 GC 
¶ 179; White House Memo Provides Inside Look At Government Shutdown Preparations, 54 GC ¶ 3; 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2012/ m-12-03.pdf; David J. Berteau & 
Ryan Crotty, Super Committee Fallout and the Implications for Defense, available at http://csis.org. 
Rather, it means that – at this point – we have few, if any, answers to the most important questions 
regarding the future of federal public procurement. So, stay tuned.
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ii. FINALLY? THe enD oF THe PoST-MiLLeniUM PRo-
CUReMenT SPenDinG BinGe
A. The new economic Reality? Regular attendees of this conference 
are familiar with this chapter’s coverage of the post-millennium federal 
procurement spending trend. Readers also recognize that, while federal 
procurement spending was always significant, it wasn’t always this sig-
nificant. In Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to just 
over $223 billion. The following years, in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 
and 20 percent spending increases. More recently, in 2011, we witnessed 
a fourth consecutive fiscal year in which federal procurement spending 
exceeded $535 billion.
Using adjusted figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS) and USASpending.gov, history is consistently being re-
written), it appears that the annual increases in federal procurement 
– from 2001 through 2008 – were never less than three times the rate 
of inflation. The experts correctly predicted that the growth rate eventu-
ally would taper; in 2009, the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally 
stalled. Yet, in retrospect, the dire warnings that the current spending 
binge was a blip – and that procurement spending would promptly retract 
– were unfounded. 
Now, after years of waiting, we see the first empirical evidence that 
the procurement spending growth cycle finally has run its course. But the 
news is not all bad for contractors. The $500+ billion plateau represents 
the high-end of a robust and sustained growth curve. Now, only time will 
tell how far the reductions go and whether they can be sustained. 
Federal Procurement Spending 
2001–2012*
Fiscal 
Year
Procurement  
Spending (in Billions 
of Dollars)
Percentage Increase 
or (Decrease) From 
Previous Year
Percentage Increase or 
(Decrease) in Consumer 
Price Index (CPI)
2012 $514* (~3-4) 1.8*
2011 $537.3 ($535.1) † (~1) 3.2
2010 $538.6 ($537.7) (~1) 1.6
2009 $540.6 ($541.3) (~0) (0.4)
2008  $541.0 ($541.8) 13.9 3.8
2007 $469.0 ($475.3) 10.5 2.8
2006 $432.0 9.8 3.2
2005 $391.3 ($391.2) 13.1 3.4
2004 $346.4 8.8 2.7
2003 $318.1 ($318.3) 20.6 2.3
2002 $263.4 18.0 1.6
2001 $223.1
*FY 2012 figures reflects only an estimate based upon preliminary reporting and the 
OMB memo, referenced below.
† Dollar figures in parentheses reflect last year’s reported numbers. Other parentheti-
cals reflect negative numbers.
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See www.USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual 
Detailed Report Tables and the Table Containing History of CPI-U U.S. 
All Items Indexes and Annual Percent Changes From 1913 to Present, 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://
www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables. 
B. Good news or Strange Misinformation? Late in the calendar 
year, the White House embarked on a surprising campaign trumpeting 
the dramatic savings that its policies have wrung out of the previously 
inefficient and bloated acquisition regime. The story line sounds great, 
but it appears dubious upon closer examination. Here’s the administra-
tion’s good news graphic, and an excerpt from the announcement follows:
 
Since the beginning of the Administration, President Obama has 
challenged Federal agencies to strengthen their acquisition and 
contracting practices by eliminating inefficiencies and buying 
smarter. In response, agencies have cut unnecessary contracts 
and launched new efforts to pool the government’s buying power 
to deliver a better value for the American people.
These efforts are paying off. The Administration reduced 
contract spending by over $20 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 
compared to last year. This reduction is the largest single year 
dollar decrease in Federal contract spending on record, and 
establishes a three-year downward trend from 2009-2012....
This progress is remarkable, and we are pleased that we have 
not only stemmed but reversed the unsustainable growth in 
contracting under the previous Administration....
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Joe Jordan, Historic Savings in Contracting – and Plans for More, OMB 
Blog (December 6, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2012/12/06/historic-savings-contracting-and-plans-more.
This strikes us a slightly overblown and, frankly, somewhere between 
deceptive and disingenuous. Our antennae rise when – on a second reading 
– recognition dawns that the neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are mentioned 
in this spending trend success story. That seems like a rather dramatic 
omission. We think there might be more to the story, and we recommend 
consulting, for example, Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Congressional Research 
Service Report RL33110 (March 29, 2011)(emphasis added), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf, which explains, among 
other things:
•	 [As	of	last	year,]	the	cumulative	total	appropriated	from	the	
9/11 for those war operations, diplomatic operations, and medical 
care for Iraq and Afghan war veterans [wa]s $1.283 trillion 
including[, among other things]: $806 billion for Iraq; $444 
billion for Afghanistan; and $29 billion for enhanced security….
•	 94%	of	this	funding	goes	to	the	Department	of	Defense	(DOD)	
to cover primarily incremental war-related costs, that is, costs 
that are in addition to DOD’s normal peacetime activities…. 
(Emphasis in original.)
•	 Total	war	funding	for	iraq rose sharply … in the fall of 2002 
to $53 billion in the invasion year of 2003, almost trebling to 
$131 billion in FY2007, and peaking at $142 billion during the 
surge in FY2008. ... With the … withdrawal plan …, total war 
costs for Iraq have begun to decline, dropping to $96 billion in 
FY2009 to $66 billion in FY2010 and $51 billion in FY2011 
when troop levels drop to 43,000. In FY2012, costs are likely to 
be substantially less once the U.S. withdrawal is completed....
- Much of the large increases between FY2006 and 
FY2008 was due to higher procurement funding, that, 
in turn, reflects primarily an expansive definition adopted by 
the Bush Administration of the amounts needed to reset or 
reconstitute units returning from deployments, that included 
not only repairing and replacing war damaged equipment 
but also upgrading equipment to meet future needs for the 
“long war on terror”....
•	 After	 hovering	 around	 $15	 billion	 in	FY2003	 and	FY2004,	
total war costs for Afghanistan grew to about $20 billion in 
FY2005 and FY2006…. Funding then doubled to $39 billion in 
FY2007, and $44 billion in FY2008, as troop levels increased 
… and the intensity of conflict grew…. Since then, costs have 
increased sharply to $60 billion in FY2009, and $105 billion 
in FY2010 assuming the pending supplemental is approved, 
and $119 billion in the FY2011 request. ... Future costs in 
Afghanistan remain uncertain as it is not clear at what pace 
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U.S. troops may withdraw starting in June 2011 or how long U.S. 
involvement will persist.
C. Slicing and Dicing the Data at DoD. We continue to be inter-
ested in more sophisticated data that provides better, more accessible 
insights into how the federal government’s procurement dollars are spent. 
A number of additional reports and studies build upon data we have previ-
ously reported. See, e.g., Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, U.S. Department of Defense Contract 
Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base (September 2012), and U.S. 
Department of Defense Service Contract Spending and the Supporting 
Industrial Base, 2000-2011 (May 17, 2012), available at www.csis.org/
diig; see also, DOD Contract Data Show Industrial Base Trends, 54 GC ¶ 
292; DOD Competes More Services Contracts Than Contracts For Goods, 
54 GC ¶ 94. Some highlights from these data rich resources include:
•	 Between 2001 and 2011:
- dollars obligated to contract awards by DoD more than 
doubled, 
- contract spending outpaced growth in other DoD outlays; 
and
- the growth in products and services experienced a 21-year 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.4 percent and 
9.4 percent, respectively, compared to 5.4 percent annual 
growth in R&D.
•	 From 2008 to 2011, there was a profound shift in DoD contract 
spending.
- absolute obligations for services contracts declined by $25 
billion and dropped from 64 percent of total DoD acquisition 
outlays to 55 percent, and
- noncontract defense spending increased by $71 billion and 
increased from 36 percent of DoD acquisition outlays to 45 
percent.
•	 Stability? There was no significant change in overall DoD con-
tract spending between 2010 and 2011, suggesting a possible 
equilibrium in the ratio between DoD contracts spending and 
other spending has been reached. (Such a steady relationship 
for DoD spending, split between contracts and other accounts, 
has not been seen since the years 1995 to 2001.) Anticipated 
reductions in defense spending, however, likely will affect future 
DoD outlays.
•	 In 2011, DoD spending on service contract actions totaled $198 
billion, accounting for slightly under 30 percent of total DoD 
outlays and 56 percent of total DoD contract spending for the 
year (up from 50 percent the year before and 48 percent in 
2000).
•	 For much of the past decade, the Army was the primary driver 
of growth in DoD’s service contract spending, increasing at an 
average of 8.9 percent per year for the period. After reaching 
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a peak of $89 billion in 2009, Army service contract spending 
decreased substantially to $76 billion in 2011, largely as a result 
of the U.S. force drawdown in Iraq. For the past three years, 
the Army’s spending on service contracts has declined by 2.5 
percent per year.
•	 During the recent years of defense drawdowns (2008-2011), 
DoD services contract spending decreased by some $18 billion 
(a 9 percent decline) while spending on products decreased by 
$26 billion (almost 13 percent). 
•	 The highest growth rate in spending on services occurred 
in the “Other” category (the main elements of which are the 
Defense Logistics Agency and the Missile Defense Agency), 
which grew from $9 billion to $36 billion between 2000 and 
2011. Unlike the key military departments, the “Other” cat-
egory expanded after 2009, from $32 billion in 2010 to $36 
billion in 2011.
•	 Between 2009 and 2011, the total value of fixed-price con-
tracts for defense services rose 6 percent, while that of cost-
reimbursement contracts grew more than 13 percent. Time 
and materials contracts dropped in combined value by almost 
38 percent.
•	 The makeup of the top 7 defense service contractors has been 
stable, with the only differences between 2000 and 2011 being 
the disappearance of TRW (acquired by Northrop Grumman) 
and the entry of L3 into 7th place in 2011.
- More significant upheaval occurred within the rest of the top 
20, with eight newcomers compared to 2000, including three 
health care service providers: Humana, TriWest Healthcare, 
and Health Net.
- Mergers and acquisitions also played a role as Northrop Grum-
man acquired three of the top 20 contractors from 2000: TRW, 
Litton, and Newport News Shipbuilding.
D. More insight at the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). In a separate report, CSIS developed a prior data set for the 
DHS, tracking trends for 2004-2011 (with the disclaimer that 2002-2003 
mainly reflected DHS start-up costs). Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, U.S. Department of Home-
land Security Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, 
2004–2011 (November, 2012), available at http://csis.org; DHS Services 
Contracting Trending Down, But Still Significant, CSIS Finds, 54 GC ¶ 
370. CSIS found that DHS’s contract spending was relatively stable, with 
the most fluctuation in FEMA following major disasters. Some interesting 
observations include:
•	 Contract obligations were stable between 2010 and 2011, indi-
cating that DHS was spared from the effects of current budget 
drawdowns;
•	 DHS experienced a decline in contracts for services, obligations 
for which have declined by over a billion dollars since 2009; and
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•	 Contract obligations for products, largely stagnant for the 
second half of the last decade, increased dramatically in 2011, 
due almost entirely to Coast Guard contracts;
•	 While only about half of DHS contract dollars were obligated 
as a result of competitions that received multiple offers, the 
amount of dollars obligated via competition increased steadily, 
particularly in post-Katrina years, while those that were obli-
gated with no competition decreased;
•	 Since 2007, there has been a rise in DHS fixed-price contracts 
and a relative decline in cost-reimbursement contracts; and
•	 As DHS priority missions shifted from disaster relief and 
cleanup to building technology-intensive capabilities, so did 
the composition of DHS’ largest contractors. Between 2006 and 
2011, engineering and construction firms were overtaken by 
IT and consulting firms (including Computer Sciences Corp., 
IBM, Lockheed Martin, and SAIC).
e. And Peeking Behind the Curtain at the Department of State 
and the Agency for international Development (AiD). CSIS also 
provided additional insight into procurement spending at State and AID. 
Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, Contract Spending by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (June 2012)), available at www.csis.org/diig.
•	 Services dominated procurement spending, increasing from 
$1.7 billion in 2000, to $11.4 billion in 2011, an increase of 
575 percent. As a percent of procurement spending, services 
accounted for 73 to 91 percent during this period.
- During the 2000-2011 period, the largest category of services 
was professional, administrative, and management (PAMS), 
accounting for approximately $53 billion. PAMS purchasing 
increased from $800 million to $5.8 billion (or 605 percent) 
over 11 years, peaking between 2006 and 2010, during which 
it accounted for more than 54 percent of AID’s and State’s 
procurement spending.
•	 Product or supply purchasing accounted for more than a quar-
ter of AID and State spending in 2000-2001, but decreased to 
between 8 and 15 percent during the 2002 to 2011 timeframe.
•	 State and AID contracting has become increasingly competi-
tive. Except for 2006, the majority (between 52 and 68 percent) 
of contract actions were awarded each year on a competitive 
basis after receiving multiple offers. 
- The total value of competitively awarded contracts with 
multiple offers increased by 9.4 percent between 2008 and 
2011.
- During the same period, however, the total dollars awarded 
competitively after a single offer was received increased by 
24 percent per year.
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F. A Reminder on Grants: Follow The Money. Despite all of the 
attention focused upon government contracting, grant spending contin-
ues to outpace procurement spending. Consistent with the trend we’ve 
previously reported, grant spending exceeded procurement spending last 
year, as it has for ten of the last twelve years. We continue to hope that, 
eventually, the oversight and regulatory community shifts its focus from 
procurement to grants. If the government is serious about reducing its 
debts and its annual deficits, this seems unavoidable. 
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending 
2001–2012*
Fiscal Year Procurement Spending (in  Billions) 
Grant Spending 
(in Billions)
2012 $514* $531.5*
2011 $537.3 $566.3
2010 $538.6 $613.8
2009 $540.6 $664.9
2008 $541.0 $419.5
2007 $469.0 $430.1
2006 $432.0 $490.0
2005 $391.3 $441.7
2004 $346.4 $450.1
2003 $318.3 $493.7
2002 $263.4 $406.3
2001 $223.1 $330.8
*FY 2012 figures reflects only an estimate based upon preliminary reporting and 
the OMB memo, referenced above.
Total Federal Spending, www.USASpending.gov.
iii. THe onGoinG DeBATe: QUAnTiFYinG AnD  
QUALiFYinG THe oUTSoURCinG-inSoURCinG Con-
VeRSATion
On the one hand, little changed in the contentious philosophical battle-
ground of outsourcing and insourcing. Still, we continue to believe that the 
use of data may prove more meaningful than emphatic, ideological rhetoric 
(particularly if not backed up with meaningful information). We remain 
skeptical of the validity of service contract inventories (artificially tied to 
FTE’s) or apples-to-oranges cost comparisons, and fear that bad (or inac-
curate) information will be used to support ill-conceived positions. Great 
opportunities for chicanery exist. See, generally, Agency Services Contract 
Inventories Incomplete, Improving, 54 GC ¶ 313 (“Civilian agencies did not 
fully comply with statutory requirements for compiling fiscal year 2011 
services contract inventories”); Civilian Service Contract Inventories: Op-
portunities Exist to Improve Agency Reporting and Review Efforts (GAO-
12-1007), available at www.gao.gov/assets/650/648939.pdf; Industry 
Group Asks DOD to Assess Insourcing Costs, 54 GC ¶ 249(d); Slow Data 
Collection Risks DOD Contractors Performing Inherently Governmental 
Functions, GAO Says, 54 GC ¶ 124 (“Reliance on contractors and delays 
implementing an enterprise-wide system to collect relevant contractor 
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information are putting the [DoD] at risk of contractors performing in-
herently governmental functions[.… For some components,] GAO found 
that although DOD has made some incremental progress from FY 2009 to 
FY 2010, it has yet to resolve ‘the fundamental issue of how to collect the 
required data to meet the legislative inventory requirements, including 
manpower data directly from contractors.’”); Contracting Oversight Panel 
Compares Public, Private Employee Costs, 54 GC ¶ 103.
iV. BeTTeR BUYinG PoWeR 2.0: ReCALiBRATion oR  
RePACKAGinG?
On November 13, USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall rolled out DoD’s Better 
Buying Power 2.0. See Better Buying Power 2.0 Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/BBP Fact Sheet (13 NOV) Final.pdf, see 
also https://dap.dau.mil/bbp. DoD explained (with emphasis added) that:
[BBP] 2.0 reflects [DoD’s] commitment to continuous 
improvement. Significant progress has been made since BBP 
was first introduced. Affordability analysis is now part of the 
standard Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) planning process 
to facilitate investment decisions; Should-Cost estimates are 
being used as standard practice within the military Services; and 
competitive incentive contracts, services acquisitions, and 
small business opportunities are receiving greater attention and 
focus. Many initiatives that were first introduced will remain, 
while a set of new initiatives have been identified and are being 
added to address current fiscal realities. The basic goal of BBP 
remains: deliver better value to the taxpayer and Warfighter by 
improving the way the Department does business.
BBP 2.0 initiatives are organized into seven focus areas:
•	 Achieve Affordable Programs
•	 Control Costs Throughout the Product Lifecycle
•	 Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and Gov-
ernment
•	 Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy
•	 Promote Effective Competition
•	 Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services
•	 Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce 
We applaud DoD’s BBP 2.0 for adding “a new focus area to support 
and recognize members of the acquisition workforce.” To that end, DoD 
articulated initiatives that:
(1) raise standards for key leadership positions;
(2) increase professional qualification requirements;
(3) seek to recognize excellence in acquisition management; and
(4) change culture with an eye towards greater cost consciousness 
throughout the acquisition workforce. 
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We are less sanguine about some of the other initiatives, although it is 
unclear to what extent DoD can simultaneously pursue such a broad range 
of initiatives, including:
•	 enforcing affordability caps;
•	 controlling costs…;
•	 incentivizing industry by aligning profitability … with [DoD] 
goals and employing appropriate contract types;
•	 increasing the effective use of performance-based logistics;
•	 reducing cycle times while ensuring sound investment deci-
sions; 
•	 using the technology development phase for true risk reduction; 
and
•	 strengthening contract management ….
See also, DOD Rolls Out Second Generation Buying Initiative, 54 GC ¶ 
358; Government Is Not Leveraging Its Aggregate Buying Power, GAO 
Says, 54 GC ¶ 319; Strategic Sourcing: Improved and Expanded Use Could 
Save Billions in Annual Procurement Costs, (GAO-12-919) available at 
www.gao.gov/assets/650/648644.pdf; DAU Revises Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, 54 GC ¶ 322(a); DOD Releases New Taxonomy for Acquisition 
of Services, Supplies and Equipment, 54 GC ¶ 278(d); AT&L Describes 
Goals, Challenges, 54 GC ¶ 225(a); Acting USD AT&L Discusses Budget, 
Strategic Guidance, 54 GC ¶ 44.
See also, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, A Case Study for Better Buying Power: Information 
Analysis Centers of the Defense Technical Information Center, (April 2012) 
(“Realigning and refocusing Information Analysis Center (IAC) capabili-
ties and products on defense system affordability is an essential task for 
DoD and Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) leadership going 
forward.”), available at http://csis.org. The report offers the following 
Tactical Recommendations:
1. Focus IAC program products on three BBP Initiative elements:
a. Mandating affordability as a requirement,
b. Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry,
c. Promote real competition.
2. Revise and refocus internal DTIC/IAC program policies, proce-
dures, and products to contribute to several other desired BBP 
Initiative outcomes:
a. Identify and address causes of poor tradecraft in services 
acquisitions,
b. Eliminate redundancy in warfighter portfolios and reduce 
non-productive processes,
c. Identify and suggest alternatives to eliminate/reduce bar-
riers to small business participation.
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V. ACQUiSiTion WoRKFoRCe: STALLeD  
RePLeniSHMenT, LoST MoMenTUM, BLeAK  
PRoSPeCTS 
While we were encouraged by Frank Kendall’s efforts to increase the 
profile of the acquisition workforce in BPP 2.0, above, it is clear that DoD 
no longer intends to fulfill its prior pledge to increase the acquisition 
workforce with an infusion of 20,000 new professionals. No one should be 
surprised by this harsh reality. See, e.g., Daniel I. Gordon, Feature Com-
ment: Reflections On The Federal Procurement Landscape--Part II, 54 GC 
¶ 51 (emphasis added):
Although the progress was limited and the outlook remains 
problematic, I believe that we made headway in strengthening 
the federal acquisition workforce. ... Despite the investment of 
much time on the Hill and the generally supportive reaction we 
received from both Republicans and Democrats, in both houses, 
we did not get the full $158 million we asked for – but 
we nonetheless saw agencies devote more resources to their 
acquisition professionals. That pattern repeated itself for FY 
2012 as well.
We succeeded in reversing the trend of slashing the numbers 
of 1102s, both across DOD and in many (but not all) civilian 
agencies. The numbers of 1102s are up, on the order of a 5- to 
12-percent increase from a few years earlier. … [Nonetheless], 
I am confident that we are not yet at an adequate level. 
Moreover, … we must anticipate a large number of retirements 
over the next five years.
With the mood on the Hill not favorable to further federal hiring, 
I am concerned that we will repeat the mistake of the past 
and let the number of 1102s go down again.
See also, generally, Acquisition Workforce Fund Needs Metrics, Distribution 
Guidance, 54 GC ¶ 203 (“[DoD] … should issue guidance on the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF) to clarify when and 
how funds should be collected, distributed and used; establish DAWDF 
outcome-based performance metrics; and clearly align DAWDF’s fund-
ing strategy with DOD’s strategic human capital plan for the acquisition 
workforce..... DOD’s acquisition workforce grew by 17,536 personnel, 
from about 118,445 in fiscal year 2009, to 135,981 in December 2011.... 
Approximately $321 million in DAWDF funding has also been allocated 
to increase the … the contract oversight workforce at the [DCAA] and the 
[DCMA].”) See also (from after we went to print last year), Acquisition 
Workforce Grew In FY 2010, FAI Finds, 54 GC ¶ 61; FAI, FY2010 Annual 
Report on the Federal Acquisition Workforce, available at www.fai.gov/
pdfs/FAI_2010_Annual_Report_12_21_11_FINAL.pdf.
Vi. THe BienniAL PSC SURVeY: MoRe oF THe SAMe, WiTH 
A TWiST
One of the more interesting resources last year was the biennail 
survey of federal acquisition and procurement professionals, now in its 
9-11
NOTES
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
sixth iteration. Professional Services Council & Grant Thornton, The 
Balancing Act: Acquisition in Unabated Crisis (December 2012), avail-
able at http://www.pscouncil.org/. On the one hand, the “2012 findings 
reinforce the notion that the more things change, the more they stay the 
same.” Not surprisingly, however, last year “budget stability was added 
as a top concern[.]” As always, the survey results are thought-provoking. 
While this only scratches the surface, some of this survey’s highlights 
include:
•	 “general[] concern[] about the implications of both ongoing 
budget reductions and pending sequestration cuts, regardless 
of whether the sweeping cuts come to fruition.”
•	 “significant concerns about the state, readiness, size and support 
for the acquisition workforce.... [R]eal concern that fiscal reali-
ties will place increasing pressure on the acquisition workforce. 
The poaching of experienced acquisition resources for better pay 
among federal agencies has also … [raised] issues, from loss 
of institutional knowledge to unjustified promotions creating 
execution risk.”
•	 “participants … rate[d] the importance and competency of 
their workforce’s ability to obtain the best price, outcome, 
modifications and other related aspects of a contract. One 
acquisition professional reporting that his office does not use 
negotiation at all. ... Nearly two-thirds … cited such skills as 
being extremely important, but only one in 10 believe their 
acquisition workforce is highly competent in that area, and 
more than 25 percent … said the skill is either nonexistent 
or in need of improvement.”
•	 “resources were overextended in responding to the oversight 
community, and that few if any resources were available 
to respond. … Acquisition executives reported feeling in-
hibited about taking reasonable business risks, especially 
when it could require additional explanation or reporting 
to oversight authorities. … A majority … felt the demand 
for oversight was going to increase, even with declining 
budgets.”
•	 “budget pressures, the increase in risk from oversight activity 
and the comparative clarity for decision justifications have all 
driven the increases in LPTA as the primary source selection 
criteria[.]”
See also, Contractors’ Relationships With COs, Auditors Continue To 
Deteriorate, Survey Says, 54 GC ¶ 68 (“The percentage of contractors 
that rate their relationships with Government contracting officers 
and auditors as fair or poor increased in the last year….. ‘DCAA’s 
production-oriented culture has been replaced by a system in which 
the DCAA takes far longer to issue lower quality reports,’ Grant 
Thornton said.”); http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GT 
Com/Government%20contractors/FINAL17thSurveyCoverhighlights 
SMALLcomplete.pdf.
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Vii. SAYinG THe WoRDS “SHAReD SACRiFiCe”:  
ConTRACToR FATALiTieS BeGin To enTeR THe  
MAinSTReAM 
By the end of 2012, nearly 3,000 contractors had died in Iraq, Afghani-
stan, and Kuwait. We continue to be frustrated with the extent to which 
these extraordinarily high contractor fatalities (and, more broadly, injuries) 
remained almost entirely outside the public’s consciousness. Among other 
things, we believe that, in a representative democracy, public awareness 
of the human cost of our nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. A 
significant body of research suggests that the public is at least somewhat 
sensitive to military casualties, and we continue to wonder what impacts, 
if any, derive from a significant substitution of contractor deaths for mili-
tary fatalities. See, generally (long-delayed, but finally in print), Steven L. 
Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect 
of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, 6 J. of nat’l seC. l. & 
Pol’Y 11 (2012), also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1826242. The 
Labor Department continues to earn kudos for transparency for posting 
on the Internet the data it generates based upon claims filed under the 
Defense Base Act and the War Hazards Compensation Act, which make 
contractor employees eligible for worker’s compensation benefits pursuant 
to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. See generally 
www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm. 
Last year provided some progress, particularly in terms of DoD lead-
ership and rhetoric. Frank Kendall, now the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, raised the issue at the Cowen 
Group’s 33rd Annual Aerospace/Defense Conference (New York, Feb. 8, 
2012):
Terence Hildner … was a brigadier general in the army [who 
died in Kabul]. He came back to Dover … on a C17. I went to 
Dover for the transfer of the remains. … There’s a dignified 
transfer which is a very solemn and kind of heart wrenching for 
the families but moving ceremony. . . .
There was one other person on that C-17 and it was a contract 
employee of a Canadian firm. After we had done the transfer 
for General Hildner, General Austin, myself, General Mason and 
the Colonel did the Dignified Transfer for that Canadian citizen 
who was a contractor serving with us in Afghanistan. 
I find that very symbolic of the service that industry is providing 
to us and that you really are part of all this with us. I think that 
the respect and the dignity with which we did that and the fact 
that we all stayed to do it, sends sort of a message about how we 
feel …. It is … a way to say, “Thank you” for that.
See also SIGIR Counts Lives Lost In Iraq Reconstruction, 54 GC ¶ 
241; Special Report Number 2: The Human Toll of Reconstruction or 
Stabilization during Iraqi Freedom, available at www.sigir.mil/files/
lessonslearned/SpecialReport2.pdf. (“Reconstruction or stabilization 
operations conducted in combat zones present potentially lethal threats 
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to all participants, including military, contractors, U.S. government civil-
ians, third-country nationals, and host country citizens. Planning for such 
operations must anticipate this threat…. The human losses suffered in 
Iraq (and outlined in this report) underscore the point that when such 
operations are conducted in combat zones, they are dangerous for every-
one involved, military and civilian, U.S. and non-U.S. alike.…. Poor casu-
alty data management during reconstruction or stabilization operations 
obscures the actual human cost of such operations. …Without accurate 
records, there cannot be a reasonably complete evaluation of the human 
cost of reconstruction or stabilization efforts.”) 
Finally, on February 12, 2012, The new York tImes became the first 
major news outlet to devote a front-page article to the risks facing contrac-
tors in the battlespace. Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors, n.Y. 
tImes, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1 (“This is a war where traditional military jobs, 
from mess hall cooks to base guards and convoy drivers, have increasingly 
been shifted to the private sector. Many American generals and diplomats 
have private contractors for their personal bodyguards. And along with 
the risks have come the consequences: More civilian contractors working 
for American companies than American soldiers died in Afghanistan last 
year for the first time during the war.”). On this issue, we continue to 
believe that transparency serves the public’s interest.
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